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This thesis work proposes a novel DL-based anomaly detection framework for IoT envi-
ronments, employing higher-capacity embedded devices as a first line of defense for the IoT edge
layer. In the proposed framework, embedded devices implement the DL anomaly detection engine
at the network gateway and adapt to potential attacks by retraining on incoming network traffic.
In order to test the feasibility of this framework, two neural network models, trained on variations
of the CICIDS 2018 Intrusion Detection Data Set, are deployed and tested on the Raspberry Pi 4.
Model performance metrics, including fit and evaluation time across various batch and data sizes,
are compared alongside those of identical models running on higher-capacity devices. Device
resource metrics of CPU and Memory usage are monitored for comparison across model varia-
tions, batch and data sizes.The potential benefit of retraining models at the edge is evaluated by
comparing performance of models executing consistent retraining.
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Internet of Things (IoT) refers to a system of interrelated, interconnected physical devices
that collect and transfer data over the Internet [2] [3]. IoT devices are generally limited in computa-
tional capability and so are often unable to incorporate or employ the various security mechanisms
and protocols used by more powerful systems. In recent years, the vulnerabilities posed by IoT
have made it a common target for malicious activity, and as a result, numerous IoT intrusion de-
tection systems (IDS) have been proposed to handle attacks on the IoT ecosystem [2] [4].
As the nature of attacks targeting the IoT continues to evolve, it is vital for reliable intrusion
detection systems to be autonomous and use contemporary techniques such as machine learning
(ML) and deep learning (DL) to inform the IDS [2]. Even so, machine and deep learning-based
intrusion detection is often regarded as an IoT security solution dependent on the incorporation
of fog or cloud systems in the IoT system architecture [5–7]. The reasoning is simple: machine
and deep learning algorithms require extensive computation, power, and storage capacity. Though
what is defined as an IoT device can range broadly in terms of resource capacity and wireless
capability, security solutions proposed for IoT often assume a level of capability inappropriate for
executing complex machine learning algorithms in real-time.
However, methods to reduce the dimenesionality of training and testing data, including
Principal Component Analysis (PCA), auto-encoders, and feature selection, are being proposed
as a solution to implementing such systems in the IoT [8–11]. Such methods reduce the number
of dimensions or features of the input data and, as a result, significantly reduce device memory
requirements, training time, and processing.
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The heterogeneity of IoT device capability, combined with dimensionality reduction meth-
ods and the nature of deep neural network models, present another option: pre-trained neural
network-based intrusion detection on embedded devices. Unlike traditional machine learning al-
gorithms, saved neural network models consist primarily of the architecture of the network and
the weights of connections between neurons. The storage and processing of such information is
beyond the capability of low-power wireless sensor nodes. But improving memory speed and
processor architecture over the last several decades has resulted in small, cheap, commercially-
available embedded devices with higher resource capacity. Regardless of whether or not this trend
in technological advancement continues, IoT system deployments currently and will continue to
have widely varying architectures and security needs, dependent upon their related enterprise and
application.
The purpose of this research is to propose and evaluate an experimental IDS framework
that implements its analysis engine at the edge layer, to serve as a first line of defense for IoT
environments. As such, it is necessary to determine the feasibility of implementing deep neural
network intrusion detection on limited-resource embedded devices, as well as the effect of dimen-
sionality reduction on model performance and speed. To this end, we have trained two deep neural
network models for binary classification using reduced versions and subsets of the Canadian In-
stitute for Cybersecurity Intrusion Detection System dataset (CICIDS) 2018 [12]. These models
will be deployed to devices of varying capacity, including the Raspberry Pi 4 8GB, XPS15-9570
personal computer with Intel Core i7-8750 CPU 2.20GHz and 16GB RAM, and University of Ten-
nessee, Chattanooga (UTC) Simcenter’s Firefly cluster, in order to examine and compare system
and model performance metrics
2
1.1 Research Questions
In this thesis, we seek to address the following research questions:
• What is the trade-off of dimensionality reduction in terms of model performance, speed, and
system resources?
• Is it possible for resource-limited embedded devices to employ DL network flow-based anomaly
detection effectively?
• What are the optimal parameters, in terms of batch size and network flow collection rate, for
implementing such systems on resource-limited devices?
• Further, can anomaly detection models, implemented on such devices, adapt to network traffic
in a timely manner?
1.2 Motivation
Though lightweight classification algorithms are currently being proposed for securing the
IoT [13–15], research surrounding the testing and comparison of their performance on embedded
devices is still limited. In other efforts to circumvent the intensive computational demands of
machine learning algorithms, proposed ML-based IDS frameworks often implement classifiers on
more powerful remote systems in the cloud or fog layer [5–7].
In reviewing current literature surrounding these multi-layer framework proposals for im-
plementing ML-based intrusion detection in the IoT, a number of observations were made:
1. Multi-layer framework proposals handle the computational cost of ML algorithms by imple-
menting the classifier on servers outside the edge layer.
2. IDS implementations outside of the edge layer require that traffic anomalies go undetected
until associated flow records reach the fog or cloud layer for analysis.
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3. Though IDS implementation in the fog layer reduces bandwidth demands between the edge
and cloud, the trade-off is an increase in traffic between fog and edge layer.
4. Dependency on fog servers demands sufficient infrastructure and cost, and may not be ap-
propriate across all industries and applications that could make use of ML-based intrusion
detection for IoT environments.
5. Retraining ML models at the edge would tailor anomaly detection to local network traffic,
making the IDS more robust to attack.
In consideration of these observations alongside our research questions, the contributions
of this thesis work are listed below:
• Proposal of a novel IDS framework for IoT environment: The proposed framework im-
plements DL anomaly detection at the edge layer, refitting the model locally upon detection
of an anomaly. In this way, edge-layer devices can serve as a first line of defense by adapting
to incoming traffic in the interim between model updates.
• Development and testing of DL models for intrusion detection: Two models, trained on
normalized and PCA-reduced datasets are deployed to devices of varying resource capacity
in order to observe and compare performance metrics of average fit and evaluation time, and
average evaluation accuracy.
• Evaluation of the impact of deep learning models on embedded device resources: Re-
source metrics, including CPU load and memory, are monitored during fit and evaluation of
both models on the embedded device at various batch size and testing data interval values for
both DL models. Comparison of these metrics provides further insight into the impact of DL
on device resources.
• Evaluation of the significance of single-epoch refit to model performance: In order to
ascertain the value of retraining models on new data at the edge layer, evaluation accuracy of
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static (unchanging) and dynamic (refit at each interval) models is observed for comparison
across various batch size and testing data interval values.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: Chapter 2 covers background informa-
tion and key concepts. Chapter 3 reviews related work previously conducted in the field. Chapter
4 outlines the concept of operations behind our proposed system framework. Chapter 5 details the
stages of experimentation. Chapter 6 presents the results of testing and discusses their significance.




2.1 IoT and Embedded Devices
Internet of Things (IoT) is the interconnection or convergence of various smart devices or
‘things’ that can communicate with one another, via the Internet [2, 4, 16]. More specifically, IoT
devices can be defined as objects embedded with sensors, software, and in some cases, a perva-
sive user interface, connected to the Internet to relay and receive information to serve the broader
purpose of making some aspect of industry or daily life simpler. Some examples of IoT devices
include stand-alone embedded systems, such as the Raspberry Pi, Nvidia Jetson and Arduino prod-
ucts, low-power wireless sensor nodes for monitoring environmental conditions, as well as smart
home appliances, such as smart fridges, smart tea-kettles, Google Home and Amazon Alexa. The
‘things’ in IoT can range broadly in terms of resource capacity and communication methods across
a number of industries and applications.
This heterogeneity of IoT device capability, communication protocols and resources, in
proportion to their range of applications, presents a number of challenges to be overcome in
proposing appropriate security solutions. Inadequate security features in hardware, poorly de-
signed software with a range of vulnerabilities, default passwords and other design errors have
resulted in many IoT systems being much less secure than typical personal computer systems [17].
Further, the resource constraints of many IoT devices prevent them from utilizing existing security
mechanisms, such as group-signature based authentication, homomorphic encryption, and public-
key based solutions [18]. Many IoT devices do not even operate on the Internet Protocol (IP) as it
introduces considerable overhead, instead relying simpler communication protocols and upstream
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nodes to provide Internet access [17]. Studies of popular smart home devices have shown that due
to differing standards and communication stacks, limited computational power and high number of
interconnected devices, traditional security implementations are often not appropriate for IoT en-
vironments [16]. As the number of connected devices is projected to reach 75 billion by 2025 [19],
research into novel techniques for securing the IoT is both critical and ongoing.
2.1.1 IoT System Architecture
IoT devices are connected to the broader Internet at the edge layer via gateway devices.
As is shown in figure 2.1, IoT applications often function by collecting sensor data through these
IoT devices, and forwarding that information to higher layers for processing. The cloud, which
consists of powerful remote servers providing hosting services via virtual machines, is where most
IoT data processing takes place. The fog takes advantage of existing Internet infrastructure to push
some data processing geographically closer to the edge for more time-dependent IoT applications
[17, 20, 21].
2.2 Intrusion Detection System
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are mechanisms that monitor and analyze network traf-
fic or device system calls in order to identify and protect against intrusions and potential malicious
traffic that may threaten the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of information systems [4].
The two primary categries of IDS are Network-based (NIDS) and Host-based (HIDS), defined for
their placement and detection mechanism. Where HIDS is designed to be implemented on a single
system, NIDS captures and analyzes traffic across the network [4]. Typical IDS is composed of
three distinct modules: network or host sensors, analysis engine, and reporting system [16]. De-
pending on the classification of IDS as network or host-based, sensors collect relevant information
7
Figure 2.1 IoT system architecture
such as network traffic or host system calls and running processes. Information is then sent to the
analysis engine, which investigates and detects intrusions in the current data. Upon detection of
intrusion, the reporting system module alerts the network administrators [16].
2.2.1 Host-based Intrusion Detection
An HIDS exist on a singular device or ’host’, monitoring for malicious activity that may
be occurring within the system. It represents a more thorough approach to intrusion detection by
analysing system calls, running processes, file-system changes and application logs, in addition to
network traffic [16]. However HIDS can be computationally demanding and utilizes resources that
may be otherwise allocated to performing standard system functions. NIDS is therefore the more
common approach to securing IoT systems where device resources are limited [4, 6, 16].
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2.2.2 Network Flow-based Intrusion Detection
Traditional NIDS is designed to perform deep packet inspection (DPI) in order to inspect
the payload of every packet. Though DPI can provide greater insight into unusual behavior, the
practical application of such a method is extremely difficult for high-speed connections. Network
flow-based intrusion detection serves as a viable solution by analyzing flow records as opposed
to packet content, significantly reducing the amount of data to process and network overhead. As
such, routers from most major vendors come equipped with the capacity to perform flow account-
ing [1].
These network flow records, as defined in RFC 7011, consist of “a set of IP packets passing
an observation point in the network during a certain time interval. All packets belonging to a
particular flow have a set of common properties.” Such common properties include source and
destination addresses and port numbers [22].
The architecture of flow-based intrusion detection, illustrated in Figure 2.2, incorporates
two primary modules: a flow exporter and a flow collector. The flow exporter, otherwise known
as the observation point, captures and creates flow records from observed traffic on the network by
applying timestamps to packet header information. Flow exporter continually sends expired flow
records to the collector, determining expired records via packet header FIN (finish) and RST (reset)
flags, or timeout thresholds [1]. TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) flags FIN and RST both
signify that the connection is ended between hosts, either intentionally (FIN), or potentially as the
result of a faulty connection (RST). The inactive timeout threshold determines expiration of flows
for which no new packets have appeared in the allotted time. Active timeout threshold determines
the expiration of active flows after a much longer period has passed. Default inactive and active
thresholds for Cisco NetFlow, for example, are 15 seconds and 30 minutes, respectively [1]. Upon
receiving expired flow records, the flow collector performs network monitoring and analysis.
9
Figure 2.2 Architecture of flow-based network monitoring, adapted from [1]
2.2.3 Anomaly Detection
The two primary detection methods employed in IDS are signature-based and anomaly-
based [4]. Signature-based detection approaches focus on matching network behavior to known
attack signatures (specific traffic patterns or indicators of malware) stored in the IDS database.
Anomaly-based IDS employs a detection strategy that compares current traffic patterns to a profile
of normal behavior based on, and continually updated by, normal use network traffic data [2,4,16].
Anomalies are unusual behaviors in the network picked up by the classifier, located at the flow
collector in the case of network flow-based intrusion detection systems. The principal benefit of
anomaly-based detection, over signature-based, is in its potential to detect unknown, or zero-day
attacks [14]. The issue with anomaly-based approaches, however, is the high false-positive rate
that results from normal traffic behavior not matching the established pattern, as establishing the
scope of all normal network behavior demands processing of a considerable amount of data. For
this reason, researchers commonly employ the use of statistical and machine learning techniques
in training anomaly-based IDS [16].
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2.3 Machine Learning
In general terms, machine learning (ML) is the process of training a mathematical model
to return accurate predictions from provided input, ‘learning’ primarily through optimization al-
gorithms such as gradient descent, that seek to minimize the average ‘cost’ or ‘loss’ of the model.
Cost is a function that represents the deviation between achieved and expected output. Though
research into the field dates back to the late 1950s, recent exponential growth in computing power
and data generation and collection has given machine learning algorithms greater significance to
modern-day applications [23]. Machine learning models can be broken down into two major cate-
gories relating to the method by which the model is trained: supervised learning and unsupervised
learning. In supervised learning, values relating the input and output relationship are available in
the training data. In other words, training data is labelled. The goal is then to learn a function that
best approximates the relationship between input and output, in order to make accurate predictions
on future unlabelled input. In contrast, unsupervised learning techniques use unlabelled data in
order to understand the underlying characteristics and relationships between observations [23,24].
Supervised learning is the common approach for tackling classification tasks such as anomaly-
based intrusion detection [23]. Establishing a profile of normal traffic requires that training data
provide distinct examples of what can be considered ’normal’ and ’abnormal’ behavior, meaning
each flow record of an IDS dataset used for training classifiers must be labelled appropriately by
the provider.
2.3.1 Deep Learning
Deep learning is a category of machine learning models that seek to mimic our understand-
ing of the biological neural networks of the human brain [13]. Though research into the potential
of deep learning has existed for some time, the computational complexity and data requirements
of training artificial neural networks has hindered the adoption and application of deep learning for
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solving complex regression and classification tasks. In recent years, the development of advanced
processing units and exponential increase in data collection have facilitated a resurgence in deep
learning research [23, 24].
The basic structure of deep neural networks (DNNs), illustrated in Figure 2.3 consists of
multiple hidden layers of neurons, or parallel elements connected via links and working in parallel
to process data [13]. Neurons work by taking weighted input or ‘activations’ from the dataset or
from output connections of previous layers, summing weighted activations together and employ-
ing an function to shape the summed value and output to neurons in the subsequent layer. Each
connecting link between neurons carries the related weight value. The optimization of a neural
network model is dependent on these weights and activation function. As such, training of DNNs
consists of determining which weights and bias values best fit the model to the data according to
resulting accuracy or loss [13, 23]. Referring to Figure 2.3 below, the example feed-forward DL
model shown is trained on data consisting of 10 features or principal components, which corre-
spond to the nodes of the input layer. The two subsequent hidden layers consist of 16 neurons
each and are referred to as ‘dense’ layers, meaning each neuron is connected to every neuron of
the previous and subsequent layers. The final output layer consists of a single neuron for binary
classification. The output of this neuron determines whether or not the final result for input record
is closer to 1 or 0, labelling it accordingly.
2.3.2 Terminology
Machine learning terminology used throughout this work will be clarified here:
• Classifier: In this work, the classifier refers to the model performing the classification task.
Binary classification refers to potential model output of 0, 1 (benign or anomalous). Muilti-
class classification spans a number of possible outputs equal to the input data labels (classes).
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Figure 2.3 DNN feed-forward binary classifier: 10 principal components, 2 hidden layers, 16
neurons per layer
• Model: It is also important to distinguish the model from the underlying algorithm. The
model is the result of training an algorithm on given data, making predictions on, or classify-
ing, new input data.
• Evaluate: Evaluation, in reference to deep learning classifiers, is defined here as the pro-
cess of a model performing classification over a number of records, labelling them as either
anomalous or benign. In determining evaluation accuracy, the resulting labels are compared
against those provided in the original data.
• Fitting/Refitting: Fitting refers to the process of training the model, or ’fitting’ it to the given
data. To refit is to retrain the model on new data.
• Batch/Batch size: Batch size is a variable provided to a machine learning model for training
and evaluation. It represents the number of samples for which gradient descent is calculated
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before updating model parameters. Higher batch sizes result in a more direct path to con-
vergence (minimum loss), as more information is provided between parameter updates. The
detriment to high batch size, in terms of limited-resource computing, is an increased demand
in memory.
• Optimizer: Optimizer is the specific algorithm used to achieve the minimum loss of a DL
model. Optimizers commonly employ some variation of gradient descent. Gradient descent
is an algorithm which calculates the derivative, or ‘slope’ of the loss at a given point, to
determine the direction (positive or negative) parameters must be adjusted by a learning rate
variable to achieve lower loss. This process is repeated over a number of batches and epochs
until it is determined that the model has reached its lowest potential loss value.
• Epoch: An epoch is a single pass of all training data through the neural network, through
which weights are adjusted to reach minimum loss. Multiple epochs are generally necessary
to optimize a DL model.
• Features: Features are the data that describe a record or sample. They can be visualized as
the columns of a 2-dimensional array of samples. In deep learning, features are the input to
the first layer of the model, meaning that reducing the number of features reduces the input
and amount of data to be processed by the model.
• Dimensionality: The dimensionality of a dataset refers to the number of features per sample.
Dimensionality reduction is the process of lowering this number of features. However, dimen-
sionality and feature reduction are not necessarily equivalent. Where some feature reduction
techniques use specific criteria to select a number of best features from those available, many
dimensionality reduction techniques, such as PCA, generate an entirely new set of features
based on the original data.
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2.4 Principal Component Analysis
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a commonly-used linear dimensionality reduction
technique which uses linear combinations to explain the variance - covariance of number of vari-
ables, the end result being a new set of features which cumulatively account for some amount
of variation in the data [25]. More specifically, the PCA() function, imported from the Python
scikit-learn decomposition library and used in testing, centers the input data with a mean 0 be-
fore employing Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) to project that data to a given dimensional
space [26].
The fundamental concept of PCA dimensionality reduction is projection of a dataset X with
n features or dimensions onto a subspace with k or fewer dimensions while retaining the majority
of the variation of the original dataset [11]. The steps of this process are outlined below.
1. Features of the original dataset must be normalized and centered around a mean 0, with a
standard deviation of 1. The method of normalization commonly used in data preprocessing
for PCA is the min-max approach, demonstrated in Formula 2.1, in which X represents a
feature of the dataset and X i represents the i-th sample of that feature. max and min stand for





2. After features are centered around a mean zero, with standard deviation 1, the covariance ma-
trix Covm is calculated according to Formula 2.2, where m represents the number of instances






3. The Eigen-vectors and corresponding Eigen-values of Covm are then calculated and Eigen-
vectors are sorted by decreasing Eigen-values. In order to project to a subspace of dimension-
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ality k, the first k Eigen-vectors (having the largest Eigen-values) are chosen to form matrix
W [11].
4. Matrix W is then used to transform each sample onto the new subspace via Formula 2.3,
in which X is an n× 1 dimensional vector representing a single sample and y is the trans-
formed k×1 dimensional vector representing the transformed sample in the new subspace of
k dimensions [11].




Chapter 3 examines the related work that has already been conducted in the field. Sec-
tion 3.1 explores the various methods by which researchers have proposed to implement machine
learning intrusion detection in IoT security. Subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 discuss framework solu-
tions and comparative results of lightweight machine learning algorithms, respectively. Subsection
3.1.3 discusses the methods of dimensionality reduction used to reduce machine learning model
training time and complexity and their varying effects on resulting model performance. Section
3.2 presents a summary and discussion of the literature.
3.1 Machine Learning Intrusion Detection System for IoT
Three major approaches to handling the computational requirements of implementing ma-
chine learning in IoT security have emerged in the research. Among these are novel approaches to
the detection system architecture, employing the use of more powerful systems to take the brunt
of the computational load involved; research and development of lighter-weight machine learn-
ing algorithms for use on more resource-limited devices; and feature and dimensionality reduction
techniques to extract the most essential information from the data, reducing cost to evaluate without
significantly impacting model performance.
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3.1.1 Novel Framework Solutions
Common solutions to deep and machine learning-based intrusion detection for IoT systems
incorporate the use of more powerful cloud and fog servers for both data storage and classification
[5–7]. Samy et al. propose an attack detection framework implementing DNN models on fog-
layer system clusters. The fog layer exists between the edge and cloud layers of typical IoT system
architecture, comprising many connected domains containing virtualized servers, routers, simple
data centers, and services [5]. Authors of [5] take advantage of this infrastructure to keep DL-based
distributed IDS nearer the edge layer, providing lower latency, greater scalability, and high-speed
response. The proposed architecture framework consists of IoT smart gateways at the edge layer,
server clusters to implement the IDS in the fog layer, and more powerful cloud servers to run IDS
performance monitoring and update.
Maharaja et al. propose a three-fold mechanism for securing IoT systems, employing VPN
techniques for protecting the communication channels, ML-based traffic analysis for classification,
and a challenge-response authentication mechanism to validate suspicious sources. In order to ad-
dress the potential latency and response times of cloud-focused architectures, authors implement
their decision-tree based traffic analysis and authentication control units in fog servers, offloading
excess traffic to the cloud during peak volume periods. Testing found that the proposed frame-
work achieved lower network cost and response times at higher traffic volumes than a pure-cloud
implementation [7].
3.1.2 Lightweight ML-based Intrusion Detection for IoT
There has been some significant research into existing machine learning algorithms to de-
termine which may serve as viable options for lightweight intrusion detection on resource-limited
devices.
Authors of [27] assessed the performance of multiple ensemble and single ML classifiers on
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CIDDS-001 [28], UNSW-NB15 [29], and NSL-KDD [30] intrusion detection datasets. Classifiers
tested include Random Forest (RF), AdaBoost (AB), Gradient Boosted Machine (GBM), Extreme
Gradient Boosting (XGB), Extremely Randomized Trees (ETC), Classification And Regression
Trees (CART), and Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP). Metrics for evaluation and validation include
averages for accuracy, specificity, sensitivity and false positive rate. In addition, researchers ob-
served and compared average response time of classifiers across each dataset when implemented
on Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+, finding that while all classifiers perform similarly across all perfor-
mance metrics, CART outperformed other models’ accuracy by .01%, with the lowest false postive
rate and average response time on the Raspberry Pi.
In another study, [31], authors used a portion of the CICIDS2017 dataset to compare Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM) to DL methods for informing machine learning-based intrusion de-
tection systems, specifically in detecting port scan attempts. They compare various neuron and
hidden layer numbers for finding optimal conditions for their deep learning model and performed
no feature extraction or dimensionality reduction on the dataset before running SVM, using all 80
of the original features. The study showed that deep learning methods outperformed SVM by a
significant margin along accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score performance metrics in detecting
port scan attempts using this dataset. Though researchers provide the device specifications used
in testing, there is no comparison of execution time in their table of performance metrics for each
algorithm.
Additionally, lightweight neural network architectures are being proposed and tested. Au-
thors of [15] proposed a lightweight 12-neuron recurrent Random Neural Network (RNN) for sat-
isfactory performance with minimal computations and potential power consumption. They trained
and tested their RNN on a Bot-IoT dataset using 1,177 samples from the dataset 10 “best” features,
generated in [32], via coefficient and entropy techniques. Their results indicated that a lightweight
RNN could serve as an appropriate solution to intrusion detection on resource-limited devices.
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However, it should be noted that their experiment description made no mention of the specific
devices used for testing, nor their relative resource capacity.
3.1.3 Dimensionality Reduction Methods
Various methods of dimensionality and feature reduction for the purpose of increasing the
computational speed of training machine learning and deep learning-based intrusion detection sys-
tems have been explored in the literature.
The authors of [8] used gini importance, permutation importance, and drop-column im-
portance to provide a detailed selection of the most important features for intrusion detection in
the CICIDS2017 dataset, and found that permutation importance can be used to show 10 features
represent approximately 99% of the cumulative importance in the data. Authors then tested the
original dataset alongside a reduced dataset of only 10 features determined via permutation impor-
tance to compare feature reduction impact on performance metrics in attack detection, concluding
that the difference in F1 score, false positive and false negative rates where negligible.
In [9], the authors compare Decision Tree (DT), RF, and SVM multiclass classifiers across
the performance metrics of accuracy, precision, recall, and training time. Additionally, they use
PCA to reduce the dimensionality of their dataset, testing the training time, training accuracy
and testing accuracy of the RF model for different dimensions of: 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 50, and 100.
Authors used the IoT Network Intrusion Detection dataset from which they extracted 115 features
categorized into 3 different classifications of attacks: Man in the Middle (MitM), Mirai, and Scan,
alongside a minority of benign traffic. Researchers found that training the entire dataset at 15
features reduced using PCA optimized training time at approximately 1/6 the training time of
the original dataset with minimal detraction to testing accuracy, though 10 features is optimal for
both training time and accuracy across all subsets. Results of the study showed that RF identifies
and classifies attacks and benign data at higher accuracy with a lower training time in all cases,
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and that 10 principal components allow a significant reduction in computational resources without
compromising the quality of the detection rate.
In [10], the authors compared the effect of PCA reduction on softmax regression and k-
nearest neighbor classifiers using the KDD Cup 99 Data Set. Testing softmax regression on 3,
6, and 10 features. They found 10 to achieve the optimal detection rate, with KNN performing
significantly slower at a negligible increase in accuracy. They concluded that, given computa-
tional complexity and speed, softmax regression on reduced dataset was the preferred algorithm
for intrusion detection in IoT.
The authors of [11] compare PCA and auto-encoders as methods to reduce the dimension-
ality of the CICIDS2017 dataset. Similar to [8], the authors used PCA to reduce the dimensionality
of the original dataset to 10 principal components. Using auto-encoders, they reduce the number
of features to 56. They then tested the resulting reduced datasets using an RF classifier, finding that
RF trained on the PCA-reduced dataset was able to achieve a maximum precision value of 99.6%.
They conclude that PCA is the superior and faster method of dimensionality reduction.
3.2 Summary and Discussion
Among dimensionality reduction methods, principal component analysis stands out in its
capacity to significantly reduce computational resource requirements for building the model with-
out compromising resulting model performance metrics [9–11]. The current literature surrounding
novel framework approaches to implementing ML-based intrusion detection in the IoT is limited in
applicability. In other words, reliance upon fog systems for intrusion detection may not prove ap-
propriate across all industries and applications that can benefit from ML-based intrusion detection
for IoT environments. Additionally, such frameworks suffer from a number of drawbacks includ-
ing increased traffic between the edge and fog layers, and anomalous traffic remaining undetected
until reaching the fog or cloud layer. Research comparing lightweight machine learning algorithms
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and dimensionality reduction techniques often limit performance metrics to the accuracy and pre-
cision of the resulting model, without consideration of the time, complexity, and resource usage
in practical application [14, 15, 27, 31]. As such, further research into additional IDS frameworks,




Chapter 4 outlines the concept of operations behind the proposed deep learning intrusion
detection system. Section 4.1 provides a brief overview of the concept of operations and the
remaining sections examine each stage in greater detail.
4.1 Concept of Operations
Figure 4.1 illustrates some differences between the proposed architecture (a) and those pre-
sented in the literature (b), adapted from [5]. Both frameworks rely upon more powerful remote
servers for further analysis of attack detection information and IDS performance monitoring and
updates (represented by the red and blue arrows, respectively). However, where previous frame-
works relied upon fog layer servers to implement the traffic analysis module, the proposed architec-
ture performs anomaly detection at the edge layer by implementing the neural network classifier
at the gateway. Further detail regarding the order of operations for the proposed framework is
provided in Figure 4.2.
The concept of operations for the proposed framework consists of 4 primary phases:
1. Initial Model Training and Deployment: The initial deep learning model is trained on the
remote server to be deployed to edge-layer gateways throughout the network for anomaly
detection.
2. Network Flow Export and Collection: Gateways generate flow records of the network traf-
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fic for analysis, normalizing and reducing data through PCA for processing.
3. Flow Record Evaluation: Gateways employ deep learning model to evaluate and label in-
coming flow record data as anomalous or benign, sending subsequently labelled flow records
to the remote server upon detection of an anomaly.
4. Model Update: Gateways periodically refit the model to local network traffic, to strengthen
anomaly detection classifier. Upon receiving flow records from gateways, the remote server
determines attacks, then updates and redeploys the initial model as necessary.
4.2 Initial Model Training and Deployment
This phase, represented in the first box of Figure 4.2, will require the collection of data.
For the purpose of binary classification anomaly detection, training data must include sufficient
number of labelled records, being diverse and robust in attack range and benign traffic patterns.
Though intrusion Detection datasets or data generation methods used for initial model training
may vary, it is pertinent that finalized training datasets include identical features to the normalized
and reduced flow records later evaluated by the flow collector unit. Training of the initial model
will comprise multiple epochs, parameters tuning as described in Section 2.3, and train/test split
methods to optimize model performance.
4.3 Network Flow Export and Collection
In reference to terminology provided in Section 2.2, the network flow exporter and network
flow collector units describe separate roles both performed by the IoT gateway. In this phase,
represented in the second box of Figure 4.2, the flow exporter unit will observe network traffic
and generate timestamped flow records, using flow accounting software such as CICFlowmeter
used in [12]. The first timeout interval here represents the exporter’s inactive and active flow
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record timeout settings discussed in Section 2.2. The exporter unit will send expired records to the
collector unit for network monitoring and analysis. The flow collector unit of the IoT gateway will
continually aggregate, normalize and reduce data received from the flow exporter, in order to be
consistent with the format of data determined in the initial model training phase.
4.4 Flow Record Evaluation
In this phase, represented in the third box of Figure 4.2, the gateway IDS will evaluate
data to determine anomalous traffic using the resulting model from the training and deployment
phase, classifying flow records as either benign or anomalous (potentially malicious). Detection
of an anomaly in the current batch of flow records will trigger sending of all saved labelled flow
records to the remote server for anomaly classification, initial model performance evaluation and
possible retraining. In the event that no anomalies are detected in the current batch of evaluated
flow records, the model may be refit on all labelled records saved on the device. The second time
interval of Figure 4.2 here represents a timeout to determine if enough labelled data has aggregated
to refit the model without degrading resulting model performance metrics.
4.5 Model Update
Two processes are distinguished for updating the anomaly detection classifier. One instance
of model refitting will occur at the remote server, triggered by reception of anomalous-labelled
flow records from a gateway in the network. The resulting model is considered the primary, that
will be distributed to all edge layer gateways when training is complete. The other instance is the
secondary, or local model refit, which occurs at the gateway between primary model updates.
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4.5.1 Primary Model Update
The process of updating the primary anomaly detection classifier, shown in final box of
Figure 4.2, is divided into 3 stages: anomaly classification, model performance monitoring and
evaluation, and model retraining and redeployment.
4.5.1.1 Anomaly Classification
Flow records received by the remote server will be evaluated using a separate multi-class
classifier to provide further insight regarding potential malicious traffic. Anomalous flow records
that do not match attack types may be reclassified as benign. The binary classifier model would
then be retrained on relabelled data and redeployed to gateways, as described in the model retrain-
ing and redeployment stage, in order to facilitate the introduction of new technologies and benign
traffic patterns to the network. In addition to alerting systems administrators, attack identification
by the multi-class classifier triggers primary model performance evaluation and update. Additional
triggers for performance evaluation may include scheduled updates, discovery of new exploits, or
high ratio of anomalous to benign-labelled aggregated records.
4.5.1.2 Model Performance Monitoring
In the performance monitoring stage, the primary binary classifier will evaluate the newly
aggregated labelled flow records, monitoring model performance metrics of accuracy, precision,
false positive and negative rates. Should the evaluation indicate a drop in these metrics from those
achieved in the initial training phase, retraining of the primary model will be triggered. In the case
that performance metrics achieved in this evaluation are equal to or greater than those achieved in
initial model training, no further action will be taken, as the IDS is functioning properly.
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4.5.1.3 Model Retraining and Redeployment
Unlike secondary model refit, retraining the primary model comprises some elements of
initial model training and deployment, including multiple epochs, parameters tuning, with train/test
split and early stopping mechanisms to optimize model performance without overfitting to the new
data. Optimal performance metrics of precision, F1 score, false positive and false negative rates
will be prioritized. Achieving greater performance metrics in training than those of the initial
model will trigger model save and redeployment to gateways throughout the network.
4.5.2 Secondary Model Update
Secondary model update, shown in the third box of Figure 4.2, occurs intermittently at edge
layer gateways to further normalize the benign traffic patterns of the local network. In secondary
model update, the binary classifier is simply refit on saved labelled records at the gateway. The
end result of performing this local refit is a model that is gradually customized at each gateway
between primary model updates, making it more robust to traffic that does not align with the
patterns established by local network devices.
Additional epochs and performance monitoring are avoided in order to prevent the retrain-
ing process from interfering with other intrusion detection operations on the resource-limited gate-
way device. An issue with this method of single-epoch refit is the potential for model performance
to degrade. As such, the purpose of the second timeout interval, discussed in Section 4.3, is to
allow a sufficient amount of labelled data to accumulate before refitting. A higher timeout interval
value will result in more data accumulated, and more consistently high performance. However,
should the model degrade regardless, a higher timeout value will also result in a longer period dur-
ing which the model is performing sub-optimally. Additionally, performing a refit task over larger
amounts of data may take significantly longer, utilizing time and resources that may be better al-
located to other gateway operations. Thus a range of timeout interval values will be examined in
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Figure 4.1 IDS Architectures
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This chapter details the steps involved in the data preparation and testing processes. Sec-
tion 5.1 discusses the devices of varying capacity used in testing. Section 5.2 covers the initial
stages of data collection and preprocessing for future testing. Section 5.3 reviews the scaling and
dimensionality reduction methods used to generate two distinct datasets and models for compari-
son. Section 5.4 details the methods by which initial neural network architectures were determined
and resulting models were trained. Section 5.5 details the process of generating record timestamps
for flow export interval simulation. Section 5.6 outlines the method by which performance metrics
were collected in testing.
5.1 Devices Used
In order to examine the potential for gateway devices to implement deep learning network
flow-based intrusion detection, the Raspberry Pi 4 was chosen for its ease of use, low price and
commercial availability. Though the Raspberry Pi 4 with 8GB RAM borders the edge of what may
currently be considered IoT, the 64-bit Raspbian OS, in beta at the time of writing, is critical to the
operation of later versions of TensorFlow used in testing.
Fit and evaluate times and accuracy were also monitored on an an XPS15-9570 personal
computer with Intel Core i7-8750 CPU 2.20GHz and 16GB using CPU-enabled TensorFlow, and
the University of Tennessee Chattanooga’s (UTC) SimCenter Firefly cluster, which consists of 4
compute nodes based on the Intel Xeon Gold 6148 CPU (each node equipped with four Nvidia
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Tesla 32GB V100s) [33], in order to establish a baseline representing architectures more heavily
reliant upon cloud and fog-based solutions for traffic evaluation. Additionally, UTC’s Firefly clus-
ter was used to expedite the processes of determining best neural network architecture for both
models as well as the potential benefit of continuous single-epoch refit to model performance.
All programming for this thesis work was done in Python, employing Scikit-learn [34],
TensorFlow [35], and Keras [36] libraries for model development and testing.
5.2 Data and Preprocessing
The data used for training and testing neural network models is drawn from the CICIDS
2018 Intrusion Detection Dataset, a series of CSVs converted from network traffic files collected
over the course of a month [12]. Each file is composed of 79 distinct features and together account
for 7 different attack scenarios including 15 distinctly labelled attack types across 15,831,819 sam-
ples [12]. This dataset was chosen for its consideration and inclusion of the critical characteristics
of a complete and efficient intrusion detection dataset: diversity of attacks, anonymity, available
protocols, complete network traffic, complete network interaction, feature set, labeled data sam-
ples, heterogeneity, and metadata [37]. Additionally, it includes a vast distribution of records
among a variety of attack types, and its 79 features allow for a greater difference to be examined
between standard and reduced-dimension datasets.
The processing of this data comprised the removal and subsequent addition of a number
of features, random sampling of specific attack types, data normalization using min-max feature
scaling, and dimensionality reduction via Principal Component Analysis.
It was determined by [8] that eight features of the CICIDS 2017 Dataset, which CICFlowme-
ter collects by default, are flags set to zero across the entire dataset and thus have no impact on
model results. After confirming this consistency with CICIDS 2018, these features were removed.
In addition, all categorical features from the original dataset were initially removed, as categorical
32
features are unfit for feature scaling and PCA reduction, and encoding these features would add
time and processing to models, counterproductive to the goal of determining feasibility for embed-
ded devices. However, after testing models trained with and without the “destination port” feature,
it was found that models which incorporated destination ports into their training data achieved
consistently higher accuracy, and were thus used exclusively in later testing.
Attack types for training and testing data were chosen for the number of samples included
in the original dataset, so as to have a sufficient number of records of each attack type for training
the model. Those including fewer than 10,000 records were removed. Of the 10 remaining attack
types, 5,500 records were randomly sampled, distributing 1,000 records to training and the remain-
der to the testing dataset. Two exceptions include DoS-Goldeneye attack records, only 30,000 of
which were included in testing, and DoS-Slowloris attack records, of which the 10,000 randomly
sampled were distributed evenly across training and testing data. Intent behind sampling was to
provide a generally even distribution of as many attack types as possible.
These data were then concatenated with 100,000 and 400,000 records of randomly sam-
pled benign-labelled data to provide even distribution of benign and malicious data, emphasizing
the importance of the accuracy metric in binary classification. The resulting training and testing
datasets, consisting of 69 features and comprising 200,000 and 800,000 records, respectively, were
relabelled ‘0’ and ‘1’, with ‘0’ to indicate benign records and ‘1’ for malicious.
5.3 Scaling and Dimensionality Reduction
Data normalization, and more specifically, min-max scaling, is a commonly-practiced step
in preprocessing data for machine learning and PCA as the range of data can vary widely across
features [10, 11]. Min-max feature scaling normalizes the data to a range of [0,1] by subtracting
the value of the feature minimum from the current element, and dividing that number by the fea-
ture range (maximum value - minimum value). Features were scaled by this method prior to the
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application of PCA, in which data was centered with a mean of zero. Figure 5.1 shows the ex-
plained variance ratio, or percentage of variance represented, for each principal component of the
transformed 69-feature training dataset.
Figure 5.1 Amount of variation represented by each principal component of the 69-feature
training data
The final dataset consists of 10 principal components, cumulatively accounting for approx-
imately 93% of the variation in data. This number of principal components, previously shown to
maintain high performance metrics for models trained on CICIDS 2017, was chosen to achieve a
high Reduction Ratio of 10:69, while still accounting for a high percentage of variation in the input
data [10, 11].
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5.4 Model Architecture Determination and Training
For comparison of time to fit and resulting accuracy, two models were trained on variations
of the 200,000-sample dataset. The first model training and testing data consists of the 69 features
maintained from the original dataset and normalized using min-max feature scaling, and the second
model, 10 principal components derived from the first variation. All models incorporate a sequen-
tial, feed-forward architecture, with an input layer matching the features of its training dataset, and
an output layer of a single neuron. For the model trained on 69 features, Rectified Linear Unit
(ReLU) was used as the activation function for its relative computational simplicity and resulting
speed [38]. For the model trained on 10 principal components, hyberbolic tangent (tanh) activation
function was used to ensure prediction consistency for negative input values [39]. The formulas
for ReLU and and tanh activation are shown in Formula 5.1, and Formula 5.2 respectively, where
x represents the input data and f (x) the output at each neuron.
f (x) = max(x,0) (5.1)




Number of hidden layers and number of neurons per hidden layer for final models were
determined via an iterative program, using a train-test split ratio of 80% to 20% to train neural
networks of varying architectures to a maximum of 10 epochs, with early stopping mechanisms
prioritizing the maximum validation accuracy. The number of hidden layers and neurons per layer
ranged from 1 to 6 and 5 to 100, respectively. Sequential feed-forward architecture, number of
epochs, hidden layer and neuron ranges were chosen to expedite the process of determining ar-
chitecture with highest validation accuracy, while limiting the size and complexity of the resulting
model, so as to still be appropriate for embedded devices. The resulting models for 69 full and
10 PCA-reduced datasets, summarized in Figure 5.1, achieve initial validation accuracy of 95.40%
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and 94.29%, and consist of five hidden layers each and 81 and 86 neurons per layer, respectively.
Each row of the tables below represents a layer of the model. The first column of each table shows
the name or label of the layer and its type. All layers for both models are of the ’dense’ type, de-
scribed in Chapter 2. The second column of each table shows the number of neurons that comprise
each layer, 81 for hidden layers of the 69-feature model, and 86 for those of the PCA-reduced
model. The final column of each table provides the number of trainable parameters (weights and
biases) associated with that layer, corresponding to the number of input and output connections at
each neuron of the layer.
Subsequent model creation and training incorporated these determined best architecture
hidden layer and neuron numbers with a train-test split ratio of 80% to 20% on the same 200,000-
sample training datasets. Maximum number of training epochs was set to 1,000, with early stop-
ping mechanisms prioritizing model validation accuracy to avoid overfitting the input data. Result-
ing trained models for 69-feature and 10-principal component datasets achieved validation accu-
racy of 95.61% and 95.25%, respectively.
To accurately discern the affects of PCA reduction on model task completion time and
system resources on the Raspberry Pi 4, a third model, trained on the 69-feature dataset and using
the same architecture and tanh activation function of the PCA-reduced model was generated. This
model achieved a validation accuracy of 95.88% in training.
5.5 Record Timestamp Generation
Simulation of network traffic influx for a network flow-based IDS demands the generation
of timestamps for records to imitate the number of records captured between instances of refitting
the model. Record timestamps were provided in the original dataset, but removed for the pur-
pose of nomalizing features and deriving principal components. Additionally the concatenation of
data spanning multiple days, and subsequent sampling and randomization of data for training and
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Table 5.1 Resulting best neural network architectures for IDS models
(a) Standard, 69-features model architecture
(b) Reduced, 10-principal components model architecture
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testing dataset generation would render the attempted reintroduction of the original timestamps
meaningless. As such, new timestamps were generated for the 800,000-sample testing datasets to
approximate the traffic influx during each of the 10 attacks included in the final testing data.
The authors of [12] have included attack start and end times in their description of CICIDS
2018. The number of seconds per attack were calculated and summed in instances of attack types
spanning multiple distinct attacks. This number was then multiplied by the ratio of records of
the corresponding attack type included in the final testing data to records of the same attack type
included in the original concatenated CSV files, then divided by the number records of that attack
type included in the final testing data. The resulting value was then incremented across its cor-
responding number of records in the final testing data. Table 5.2 shows the values calculated at
each step of simulated timestamp generation. Four attacks types which included fewer than 10,000
records in the original training data, were excluded from sampling and timestamp generation.
As benign data is dispersed between attacks across all provided CSV files for CICIDS
2018, the rate of benign traffic was simulated using the purely benign traffic CSV file included in
CICIDS 2017 by dividing the approximate number of seconds spanning the traffic capture by the
number of included flow records. The final testing dataset timestamps span approximately 10.52
hours, beginning at 0 and ending at 37888.0763354195. Table 5.3 shows the average number of
records, over which fit and evaluation tasks are executed for each interval value tested.
5.6 Model Evaluation and Fit Testing
The following subsections detail the processes by which comparable metrics were drawn in
system and model performance testing. Changing variables to be compared include device, binary
classifier (being either 69 feature or 10 principal component), batch size and interval value, and
CPU stress. Metrics for variable comparison include fit and evaluation time, evaluation accuracy,
CPU load percentage and memory. The final subsection outlines the method by which CPU stress
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Table 5.2 Values for Simulated Timestamp Generation
Table 5.3 Average Records per Interval Value
simulation was implemented in testing. In order to simulate various inactive and active threshold
flow exporter settings, interval variables representing 5, 10, 15, 30, 60, 120, 180, 240, 300, and
600 seconds were tested. These same interval values were used in testing fit time and evaluation
accuracy to simulate the second timeout interval of the proposed framework.
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5.6.1 Fit and Evaluation Time
Trained models and final testing datasets were deployed to each of the three systems for
testing, alongside a number of Python scripts to test model fit and evaluation times at various
interval and batch sizes. Fit and evaluation times were approximated by calling the performance
counter function of the Python Time library before and after the Keras fit or evaluate, subtracting
the former value from the latter. The performance counter function returns the value, in fractional
seconds, of a system’s performance counter to measure a short duration [40]. Fit and evaluation
times across both models and all interval and batch size values were drawn from each of the three
devices for speed comparison.
In addition, the 69-feature model utilizing tanh activation was deployed to the Raspberry
Pi 4, to compare fit and evaluation times to those of the PCA-reduced model.
5.6.2 Fit and Evaluation Accuracy
Accuracy of a machine learning model is calculated as the ratio of correctly predicted sam-
ples (True Positive + True Negative) to all predictions (True Positive + True Negative + False
Positive + False Negative). In order to observe and quantify the performance trade-off of dimen-
sionality reduction, fit and evaluation validation accuracy were calculated at each interval for all
interval and batch size values. An issue to be observed in refitting locally, without a performance
monitoring trigger or additional epochs prioritizing model performance, is the potential for accu-
racy to degrade upon refit. For this reason, both refit and evaluation accuracy of the initial model
was monitored at every interval in order to compare their respective averages. Higher average refit
accuracy would indicate performing local refit in this way has merit. To ensure consistency be-
tween model fit accuracy and validation accuracy upon fit, additional tests were run on the Firefly
cluster, pulling evaluation accuracy from a static (unchanging) version of the initial model, along-
side evaluation accuracy from before and after refitting a dynamic (changing) model, which was
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saved upon refit. To prevent redundant refitting in these additional tests, 50 distinct but initially
identical dynamic models were generated for testing each interval value and batch size, for both
normalized and reduced datasets.
5.6.3 Device Resource Metrics
In order to observe and compare resource demands of both models at varying batch size
and interval values for the Raspberry Pi 4, the ‘dstat’ application was run simultaneously with
each Python script, collecting computational load and RAM at single-second intervals. ‘Dstat’ is
a command-line application for monitoring system resource statistics [41]. CPU usage was cal-
culated by combining user and system usage percentages for each core. System usage represents
the amount of CPU time used by the kernel for low-level processes. User usage percentage repre-
sents the time used by higher-level processes in the user space, such as applications. To establish a
baseline value for this method of load calculation, ‘dstat’ was run on the Raspberry Pi 4 over a 60-
second period while the system was otherwise idle. Average CPU utilization over this period was
3.212862069% (of 400). Over the same idle period average memory utilization was established at
274.538389 MB.
5.6.4 Stress Simulation
Determining the feasibility of embedded devices as deep learning intrusion detection-
enabled flow collector units demands the comparison of fit and evaluation speed and performance
metrics as additional load or stress is placed on the device. To this end, ‘stress-ng’, a terminal-
based application for stress testing computer systems [42], was employed to run simultaneously
during additional testing for every Python script. ‘Stress-ng’ was enabled to run on all 4 cores of
the Rasperry Pi’s ARM Cortex-A72 processor simultaneously to maximize CPU load at 400%. It
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is expected that stress testing will show a significant increase in fit and evaluation times, where any
changes in model fit and evaluation accuracy will remain statistically insignificant. Nevertheless,




Chapter 6 presents an analysis and discussion of experiment results. Section 6.1 provides
an overview of processed results and methodology for data interpretation. Section 6.2 examines
the affect of batch size and PCA dimensionality reduction on device memory and CPU utilization.
Section 6.3, presents an analysis of the accuracy of static and dynamic models to ascertain the po-
tential benefit of local model refitting in the proposed framework. Section 6.4 presents a summary
and discussion of the results.
6.1 Results Processing and Comparison
Table 6.1 Raspberry Pi batch-interval profiles for results analysis
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Resource metrics were averaged alongside number of records collected at each interval, as
well as fit and evaluation times, to provide a comparable profile for each batch and interval size
for each model on the Raspberry Pi 4. Examples of such record profiles are provided in Table 6.1.
In addition, batch-interval profiles including fit and evaluation time and accuracy averages were
generated for each interval value and batch size on the XPS15 and Firefly cluster. Upon discovery
of a testing error, a number of batch sizes for 15-second intervals, all results pertaining to this
interval value were removed. Table 6.2 presents how comparison of these finalized data provide
insight into initial research questions.
Table 6.2 Methods for results analysis
6.2 Device Average Task Speed Comparison and Analysis
Aside from the obvious significant reductions and increases in task completion time in
relation to device capacity and amount of data processed, respectively, a number of trends are
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observed from the results data that conform to the understanding of DL evaluation and training
operation established in Chapter 2. First, in comparing time values across Figure 6.1 through
Figure 6.8, we find that greater deviation in task completion time exist between batch sizes at higher
interval values. The simple explanation is that increases in the amount of data to be processed
places greater significance on the amount of data processed in a single step. Second, fit times
are consistently higher than evaluate times and greater deviation exists between batch sizes. This
is also expected as the training process requires observation and adjustment of neural network
parameters. Additionally, higher batch sizes mean fewer instances of parameter adjustment across
a single epoch.
The effect of Principal Component Analysis on task completion time is minimal for both
fitting and evaluating models. In fact, time-to-complete for the reduced dataset is increased in some
instances of evaluation and fitting. A likely explanation for the minimal affect of PCA is the tanh
activation function utilized in the reduced model. The increased computation complexity of the
tanh function over ReLU is compounded across each neuron. Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 confirm
this explanation, as the 69-feature ReLU and tanh models are compared, with time-to-evaluate
consistently higher for the tanh model.
Time-to-fit is more consistent with expectations, as distinctions between reduced and stan-
dard models are slightly more pronounced, and reduced model fitting is consistently faster at lower
batch sizes. This is to be expected as PCA is shown to reduce model training time [9, 11]. How-
ever, as batch size increases, so to does time-to-fit for the reduced model in relation to that of the
standard model, surpassing it in some instances. Further, Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 show higher
fit times for the 69-feature ReLU model than those of the tanh at batch size 16. At this batch size,
only 16 records of the testing data interval are fed through the model before adjusting parameters,
making the number of trainable parameters significantly more important to fit time.
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(a) 5 Seconds (b) 10 Seconds
(c) 30 Seconds (d) 60 Seconds
Figure 6.1 Evaluation task completion time (in seconds) for 5, 10, 30, and 60-second intervals of
testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 (models include 69-feature
ReLU activation and 10-feature tanh activation)
6.3 Effect of PCA, Batch Size on Embedded System Resources
Further insight into possible explanations for the limited impact of PCA on fit and evalua-
tion speed may be gained through observation of device resources during task execution. Section
6.3.1 and Section 6.3.2 examine the relationships of model reduction, batch size and interval val-
ues, to system memory and CPU usage, respectively. Section 6.3.3 discusses observations made
from comparison of normal execution metrics to those monitored under stress.
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(a) 120 Seconds (b) 180 Seconds
(c) 240 Seconds (d) 300 Seconds
(e) 600 Seconds
Figure 6.2 Evaluation task completion time (in seconds) for 120, 180, 240, 300, and 600-second
intervals of testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 (models include
69-feature ReLU activation and 10-feature tanh activation)
6.3.1 Memory
As is shown in Figure 6.9, Figure 6.12, PCA significantly reduces fit and evaluation RAM
usage at a consistent percentage. Where standard model usage maintains above one 1,000 MB
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(a) 5 Seconds (b) 10 Seconds
(c) 30 Seconds (d) 60 Seconds
Figure 6.3 Fit task completion time (in seconds) for 5, 10, 30, and 60-second intervals of testing
data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 (models include 69-feature ReLU
activation and 10-feature tanh activation)
of RAM across lower interval values of 300 and 600 seconds, just under at higher intervals, the
reduced model usage stays approximately 600 MB throughout. Considering the established idle of
275 MB alongside the greater range of signed values in the reduced dataset, this ratio is compatible
with expectations.
Figure 6.13 and Figure 6.14 compare the RAM usage of fit and evaluation tasks for 69-
feature ReLU and tanh models. Here it can be seen that tahn model RAM is slightly higher for
fit and evaluation tasks, a result of differing architectures. The tanh model includes an additional
5 neurons per hidden layer and with these, the associated trainable parameters. In other words,
there are simply more values to store and update for the tanh model. It is also significant to note
that RAM usage appears to trend slightly lower at much higher interval sizes. Interval value does
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(a) 120 Seconds (b) 180 Seconds
(c) 240 Seconds (d) 300 Seconds
(e) 600 Seconds
Figure 6.4 Fit task completion time (in seconds) for 120, 180, 240, 300, and 600-second intervals
of testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 (models include 69-feature
ReLU activation and 10-feature tanh activation)
not increase the amount of data processed simultaneously (represented by batch size), but rather
the number of times simultaneous data processing must occur, depending on the batch size. In
other words, the number of records in the interval period, divided by the batch size, is roughly
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(a) 5 Seconds (b) 10 Seconds
(c) 30 Seconds (d) 60 Seconds
Figure 6.5 Evaluation task completion time (in seconds) for 5, 10, 30, and 60-second intervals of
testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 on the Raspberry Pi 4 (models
include 69-feature ReLU activation, 69-feature tanh activation, and 10-feature tanh
activation)
equivalent to the number of times a data processing task occurs over a single epoch. Thus, batch
size, as mentioned in Chapter 2, should be a greater contributing factor in determining the feasibil-
ity of performing such tasks on lower-memory systems. Even so, Figure 6.9 through Figure 6.12
show that the deviation of memory usage across batch sizes is not significant for either model, as
deviation across batch sizes is in the order of tens of MB.
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(a) 120 Seconds (b) 180 Seconds
(c) 240 Seconds (d) 300 Seconds
(e) 600 Seconds
Figure 6.6 Evaluation task completion time (in seconds) for 120, 180, 240, 300, and 600-second
intervals of testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 on the Raspberry Pi
4 (models include 69-feature ReLU activation, 69-feature tanh activation, and
10-feature tanh activation)
6.3.2 CPU Load
In examining computational load values presented in Figure 6.15 and Figure 6.16, a num-
ber of trends emerge in relation to model dimensionality, task performed, batch size and interval
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(a) 5 Seconds (b) 10 Seconds
(c) 30 Seconds (d) 60 Seconds
Figure 6.7 Fit task completion time (in seconds) for 5, 10, 30, and 60-second intervals of testing
data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 on the Raspberry Pi 4 (models include
69-feature ReLU activation, 69-feature tanh activation, and 10-feature tanh activation)
values. The first trend observed is that CPU usage is higher over periods of fitting than those of
evaluation. The simple explanation relates to the computational cost of calculating and adjusting
model parameters upon processing every batch, an aspect of training that is not present in model
evaluation.
Another, more immediately apparent trend, is that CPU usage, while performing fit and
evaluate tasks over the PCA reduced model, is consistently higher than that of the standard models,
deviation between these values increasing at higher intervals. Two possible explanations relate to
the differences in activation function and input data of these models: First, the primary contributing
factor is resulting in higher CPU usage among tanh models is the increased computational com-
plexity of the tanh activation function over ReLU. Multiplying this complexity increase across all
52
(a) 120 Seconds (b) 180 Seconds
(c) 240 Seconds (d) 300 Seconds
(e) 600 Seconds
Figure 6.8 Fit task completion time (in seconds) for 120, 180, 240, 300, and 600-second intervals
of testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 on the Raspberry Pi 4
(models include 69-feature ReLU activation, 69-feature tanh activation, and 10-feature
tanh activation)
activation occurring over a batch of predictions increases CPU load. However, the PCA-reduced
model maintains a higher load for fit and evaluation tasks than its 69-feature tanh counterpart.
Aside from the changes in architecture resulting from a lower number of features, the distinction
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(a) 5 Seconds (b) 10 Seconds
(c) 30 Seconds (d) 60 Seconds
Figure 6.9 Memory usage (in MB on Raspberry Pi 4) of fit and evaluation tasks for 5, 10, 30, and
60-second intervals of testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 (models
include 69-feature ReLU activation alongside the same model running under stress)
between these models is the nature of the input testing data. Where the values of the 69-feature
input data range from 0 to 1 across all features, principal components evaluated by the reduced
model have a higher range of both positive and negative values centered about a mean of 0. The
computation of this larger range of signed values may add additional load to the model.
6.3.3 Stress Comparison
Though stressed device memory usage, represented in Figure 6.9 through Figure 6.12, is
consistently higher than that of the device running normally, the margin of difference is in the order
of tens of MB and may be explained by the memory cost of running the stress-ng application. CPU
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(a) 120 Seconds (b) 180 Seconds
(c) 240 Seconds (d) 300 Seconds
(e) 600 Seconds
Figure 6.10 Memory usage (in MB on Raspberry Pi 4) of fit and evaluation tasks for 120, 180,
240, 300, and 600-second intervals of testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128,
and 256 (models include 69-feature ReLU activation alongside the same model
running under stress)
load for tasks under stress was not considered for analysis, as stress-ng seeks to maximize load
across all cores for its duration. Thus little insight would be gained from comparison of this metric
across models, tasks, batch and interval sizes under stress.
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(a) 5 Seconds (b) 10 Seconds
(c) 30 Seconds (d) 60 Seconds
Figure 6.11 Memory usage (in MB on Raspberry Pi 4) of fit and evaluation tasks for 5, 10, 30, and
60-second intervals of testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 (models
include 10-feature tanh activation alongside the same model running under stress)
Figure 6.17 through Figure 6.20 compare the standard (ReLU) and reduced model evalu-
ation and fit times while running the ‘stress-ng’ application. It is made clear in both figures that
sharing the CPU with the ‘stress-ng’ application increases task completion time across all intervals
and batch sizes, more than doubling it in some instances. Additionally, trends observed in the task
speed comparison of Section 6.2 remain consistent for the device running under stress. The ratio
of task-completion-time to time-interval is at its highest in fitting and evaluating 5 seconds of data
at batch size 16. It is worth noting that both fit and evaluation at this interval and batch size are
completed in under 1 second even under stress, meaning it is feasible for the Raspberry Pi 4 to
perform evaluation at a five-second flow record expiration timeout setting, even under stress, at a
batch size of 16.
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(a) 120 Seconds (b) 180 Seconds
(c) 240 Seconds (d) 300 Seconds
(e) 600 Seconds
Figure 6.12 Memory usage (in MB on Raspberry Pi 4) of fit and evaluation tasks for 120, 180,
240, 300, and 600-second intervals of testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128,
and 256 (models include 10-feature tanh activation alongside the same model running
under stress)
6.4 Accuracy Analysis for Static and Dynamic Models
Figure 6.21 shows average validation accuracy achieved across 92 distinct models. Two
static models, being the same described in Section 5.4 and used throughout testing, performed
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(a) 5 Seconds (b) 10 Seconds
(c) 30 Seconds (d) 60 Seconds
Figure 6.13 Memory usage (in MB on Raspberry Pi 4) of fit and evaluation tasks for 5, 10, 30,
and 60-second intervals of testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256
(models include 69-feature ReLU activation, 69-feature tanh activation)
evaluation across all represented batch size and interval values. The remaining 90, initially identi-
cal to static models, were refit and saved after each evaluation to simulate adaptation to continuous
anomalous traffic. Distinct models for each interval-batch pair ensures no model retrains on the
same data twice.
Results show static accuracy for both standard and reduced to be identical across all batch
sizes of a given interval to be identical, as would be expected. Though batch size is a considerable
parameter in training, no parameters are adjusted in evaluation. Additionally, standard deviation
in accuracy across all interval values for both static models were in the order of 5 decimal places.
Despite principal components representing a cumulative 93% of the variation in training data, static
accuracy for the reduced model was considerably lower than that of the standard, so much as to
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(a) 120 Seconds (b) 180 Seconds
(c) 240 Seconds (d) 300 Seconds
(e) 600 Seconds
Figure 6.14 Memory usage (in MB on Raspberry Pi 4) of fit and evaluation tasks for 120, 180,
240, 300, and 600-second intervals of testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128,
and 256 (models include 69-feature ReLU activation, 69-feature tanh activation)
be impractical for detecting anomalies. It should be noted that models were trained on a minority
(20%) of the overall data.
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(a) 5 Seconds (b) 10 Seconds
(c) 30 Seconds (d) 60 Seconds
Figure 6.15 CPU usage (in percent of 400 on 4 cores of Raspberry Pi 4) of fit and evaluation tasks
for 5, 10, 30, and 60-second intervals of testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64,
128, and 256 (models include 69-feature ReLU activation, 69-feature tanh activation,
10-feature tanh activation)
Further examination of accuracy averages, provided in Table 6.3, show that average ac-
curacy of our 69-feature dynamic models steadily improves as batch size increases, surpassing
average static model accuracy at 256 samples. This conforms to the understanding of batch size in
model training provided in Chapter 2. Higher batch sizes represent a greater number of samples
over which gradient descent is calculated before adjusting tensor weights, meaning faster conver-
gence. Though average accuracy of the dynamic reduced models is less predictable in this regard,
Table 6.3 show it to be higher than that of the standard static model across most batch sizes.
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(a) 120 Seconds (b) 180 Seconds
(c) 240 Seconds (d) 300 Seconds
(e) 600 Seconds
Figure 6.16 CPU usage (in percent of 400 on 4 cores of Raspberry Pi 4) of fit and evaluation tasks
for 120, 180, 240, 300, and 600-second intervals of testing data across batch sizes 16,
32, 64, 128, and 256 (models include 69-feature ReLU activation, 69-feature tanh
activation, 10-feature tanh activation)
6.5 Summary and Discussion
Results of testing indicate network edge DL-based anomaly detection via the proposed
framework is feasible for embedded devices such as the Raspberry Pi 4. While fit and evaluate
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(a) 5 Seconds (b) 10 Seconds
(c) 30 Seconds (d) 60 Seconds
Figure 6.17 Evaluation task completion time (in seconds) for 5, 10, 30, and 60-second intervals of
testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 (models include 69-feature
ReLU activation and 10-feature tanh activation, alongside both models running under
stress)
Table 6.3 Average static, dynamic accuracy for both models
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(a) 120 Seconds (b) 180 Seconds
(c) 240 Seconds (d) 300 Seconds
(e) 600 Seconds
Figure 6.18 Evaluation task completion time (in seconds) for 120, 180, 240, 300, and 600-second
intervals of testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 (models include
69-feature ReLU activation and 10-feature tanh activation, alongside both models
running under stress)
times are considerably higher than those of of the XPS15 and Firefly cluster, an average of only
.2 seconds is required for the Raspberry Pi to retrain models over 5 seconds of aggregated data,
representing the highest task-to-interval ratio of 4%. In addition, resource metrics collected show
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(a) 5 Seconds (b) 10 Seconds
(c) 30 Seconds (d) 60 Seconds
Figure 6.19 Fit task completion time (in seconds) for 5, 10, 30, and 60-second intervals of testing
data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 (models include 69-feature ReLU
activation and 10-feature tanh activation, alongside both models running under stress)
that though dimensionality reduction significantly reduces memory usage, it has negligible impact
on processing requirements and resulting time required to process data. Rather, choice of neural
network architecture and activation functions are of greater importance to these metrics. Finally
performance testing of static and dynamic models show improved average accuracy from perform-
ing single epoch refit at higher batch sizes. As resource monitoring has indicated batch size has
little impact on system memory usage, batch size of 256 is both achievable and preferable for edge
network anomaly detection.
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(a) 120 Seconds (b) 180 Seconds
(c) 240 Seconds (d) 300 Seconds
(e) 600 Seconds
Figure 6.20 Fit task completion time (in seconds) for 120, 180, 240, 300, and 600-second
intervals of testing data across batch sizes 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 (models include
69-feature ReLU activation and 10-feature tanh activation, alongside both models
running under stress)
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In this work, we have proposed a novel framework for implementing DL-based anomaly
detection at the edge layer. It relies on embedded devices for performing network monitoring and
classification and adapts to potential malicious traffic by retraining upon detection of anomalies.
To determine the feasibility of the framework, we trained two neural network models of varying
dimenionality for binary classification, and monitored model performance and resource demands
on the Raspberry Pi 4. In addition, validation accuracy of both models was tested upon consistent
refitting to various intervals of testing data. In the experiments conducted, the trade-off of PCA
dimensionality reduction in terms of model accuracy and speed is often negligible, in some cases
even detrimental, though accuracy upon refit was found to be more consistent than in other models.
In terms of system resources, memory usage of the reduced model was roughly half of its coun-
terpart for a dimensionality reduction ratio 10:69. Additionally, the highest batch size of 256 and
higher timeout intervals for refitting are shown to be achievable and to facilitate consistently higher
model accuracy upon refit. Further, refitting upon the lowest tested inactive record timeout value
requires only 4% of the amount of time taken to accumulate data. Together, these results indicate
that it is not only feasible of resource-limited devices to employ DL network flow-based anomaly
detection effectively, but that anomaly detection models, implemented on such devices can adapt
to network traffic in a timely manner.
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7.2 Future Work
Though it has been shown that the Raspberry Pi 4 can utilize more complex DL models
for anomaly detection effectively, further evaluation of the effect of PCA reduction on model and
device resource metrics is necessary. Additionally, while testing has shown batch size to have in-
significant impact on device memory usage, a deeper examination into its affect on paging, L1,
L2 cache memory should be conducted. Future testing will emphasize identical neural network
architecture, additional model performance metrics, and feature a range of dimensionality reduc-
tion techniques. Furthermore, though performing single-epoch refit can improve the accuracy of
the current model, it is not clear that a higher-accuracy classifier would benefit. As the current
ratio of fit-time to interval period permits, future testing will seek to determine a practical limit for
multi-epoch training in real time.
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